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The Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMBT) has 
called for listed companies to have 1/3 of their board 
members independent. In addition, a change in the 
CMBT’s Corporate Governance Principles requested 
the listed companies to include at least one woman in 
their boards based on ‘’comply or explain’’ approach. 
Unfortunately the expansion of boards due to the 
independence requirement caused the ratio of women 
in listed companies to decrease to 11% in 2012 from 
12% in 2011.
7EFERGÒ9RMZIVWMX]79[MXLXLI½RERGMEPIRHSVWIQIRX
of General Consulate of Sweden in Turkey and in 
strategic partnership with Egon Zehnder International 
Turkey, has initiated the “Independent Women Directors 
(IWD)” project in 2012.The project aims to help 
companies to give priority to women when nominating 
independent directors and hence help them to realize 
both mandates at the same time. Through increasing 
the number of women directors in the capacity of 
independent corporate board member, IWD Project 
aims to help Turkish women to hold more senior roles 
MRXLIGSVTSVEXI[SVPHPIEHMRKXSLEZIQSVIMR¾YIRGI
on setting the corporate political agenda and eventually 
have more say on the national socio-political roadmap.
IWD has the objective of supporting women in being 
nominated for independent board member roles in 
listed companies in Turkey. To this end, an inventory 
of nearly 300 board ready women was formed with 
MRHMZMHYEPGSRWIRXW)EGLGERHMHEXILEWFIIR½PXIVIHMR
the light of the board ready women criteria created 
by the project team taking into consideration the 
environment of Turkish business world as well as the 
criteria deployed by Global Board Ready Women 
(GBRW) initiative. GBRW, a similar project was 
rolled out by European Business Schools in strategic 
partnership with Financial Times. Although IWD project 
has produced the board ready women inventory, there 
is still much to do. Transformation of the role of women 
in the business world will only happen as an outcome of 
a committed and consistent set of organized activities 
and devoted supporters.
Amb. Jens Odlander
Consul-General of Sweden 
in Istanbul  
Gender equality has been one of the 
core values of Sweden since decades. In 
our country, it is of utmost importance 
that women and men have equal 
opportunities in all aspects of life, as 
we believe gender equality is a key 
determinant of our prosperity. It’s also a 
basic principle in human rights. However, 
when it comes to gender parity at the 
top echelons of business organizations, 
even in Sweden, we have a long way to go. 
Gender diversity in the boardroom is proven to have a positive 
effect on the governance quality of companies. Furthermore, it 
is also established that companies with female directors have a 
competitive advantage in attracting the best female talent and 
develop products and services that appeal to women. Most 
importantly diverse boards empower women and provide 
positive role models for young professional women.
While working on improving the gender diversity in corporate 
boards and in other positions of authority in our own country, 
we also help initiatives that share the same objectives in other 
countries, as we believe that the values of gender equality 
must be embraced globally. The Swedish Consulate General in 
Istanbul provides support to several projects in that respect and 
one of those projects is the IWD project. 
We are aware of the fact that it takes time to change established 
norms and cultures. We believe that the IWD project, with the 
work that has been done up to now, has put the issue on the 
agenda of corporate boards, the regulators and women who are 
ready to serve on the boards successfully. We are happy that we 
have extended our support to the project for the third year in 
2014.
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Our Untapped Potential: Women
Economic development is strongly associated with the value 
that societies attribute to women. It is now a well-known fact 
that economic prosperity and advancement of women inclusion 
in economic and social life are closely linked. It is not a mere 
coincidence that countries which have their women participating 
in every aspect of life more strongly are regarded as more 
GHYHORSHG+LJKHUZRPHQHPSOR\PHQWÀJXUHVKLJKHUQXPEHURI
women managers and directors in business life, more women in 
academic life, in arts, in sports are just a few examples among 
many others that are very essential to unlock the full potential of 
a nation’s human resources. 
Thanks to successful macroeconomic and structural policies 
implemented in 2000’s, Turkey has witnessed a comprehensive 
transformation process where economic fundamentals 
strengthened, economic stability was established and national 
income per capita in USD terms tripled.  
Having an inclusive growth vision always in place enabled us to 
enjoy a fast development path almost in every facet of life. In this 
regard, legislative measures and incentives to enhance women 
participation in work force have constituted a fundamental 
part of our reform agenda. Consequently, women participation 
UDWH LQ ODERU PDUNHW KDV ULVHQ VLJQLÀFDQWO\ %HVLGHV VLJQLÀFDQW
improvements in women entrepreneurship has been achieved 
by means of different support mechanisms in place and Turkish 
women have become more and more active in running businesses. 
In addition to all these legislations and support mechanisms, 
“voluntary” initiatives have also been launched by our different 
institutions. Capital Markets Board of Turkey‘s efforts to support 
gender equality at Borsa Istanbul Companies’ management levels 
through having a recommended quota for women, together with 
a time frame and policy to achieve these quotas, are important 
steps taken in the right direction. 
,PSRUWDQWWRQRWHLVWKDWUDWKHUWKDQMXVWLQFUHDVLQJVKHHUÀJXUHV
for the sake of appearance, all these regulations are put in place 
WRDOORZRXUHFRQRP\DQGSDUWLFXODUO\RXUEXVLQHVVHVWREHQHÀW
from the improved decision-making that greater gender diversity 
can bring. 
Yet, the number of women in work life either as a worker, manager 
or business owner is far from satisfying. We have set ambitious 
goals for 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the foundation 
of the Republic of Turkey. Reaching those targets require achieving 
higher education levels for the whole society, improvement in 
human capital and progress in technological change, advancement 
in innovation, stronger corporate governance approach and hence 
increased competitiveness. Obviously, all these will necessitate 
a more inclusive participation of all segments of the society, 
especially of women. 
It will not be possible for us to become a well-developed society 
unless our women take their place in economic and social life 
they deserve. Although success stories of Turkish women in many 
distinct areas from arts to sports, business to sciences make us 
very hopeful for the future, we still need further progress and this 
can only be achieved with a complete and coordinated approach 
that encompasses both the public institutions and civic initiatives. 
Much has been done and important progress was made in this 
regard, but we are very well aware that further steps are still 
needed on our way to 2023. We all have duties and responsibilities 
and therefore shall play our parts to make these good examples to 
LQFUHDVHDQGÁRXULVKWRZLGHUVHJPHQWVRIWKHVRFLHW\
Having this opportunity, I would like to emphasize my appreciation 
to the Independent Women Directors for their eagerness and 
contribution to our country’s development process they make by 
encouraging and supporting women participation in business life. I 
wish them every success in their endeavors.   
FOREWORD
Ali Babacan
Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey Responsible for the Economy
“The number of women in work life either as a worker, 
manager or business owner is far from satisfying. We have set 
ambitious goals for 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of 
the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.”
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1.1 Background 
Global statistics indicate that women are severely 
underrepresented on the boards of the world’s largest publicly 
traded corporations. This lack of gender parity in the governance 
of business corporations, and especially in the governance of 
ÀQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIUHFHQWÀQDQFLDOFULVHVKDV
ignited a global debate and calls for intervention. 
While boardroom homogeneity with respect to gender is 
generally accepted as an indication of entrenched boards and bad 
governance, countries responded to the calls with two distinct 
UHJXODWRU\ PRGHOV QDPHO\ TXRWDV DQG GLVFORVXUH 7KH ÀUVW
regulatory strategy, board gender quotas imposed by legislators, 
mandates a particular level of gender balance in the boardroom. The 
second strategy requires corporations to disclose their diversity 
related governance practices to the public. These strategies are 
not mutually exclusive - some countries have implemented both 
strategies in parallel. 
The quota-based approach adopted by Norway, sets the stage for 
subsequent legislative interventions in Iceland, Italy, France, Belgium 
and Germany, especially after the publication of empirical research 
providing evidence that the quota did not have a negative effect 
on the value and competitiveness of Norwegian corporations, and 
indeed had a positive effect on improving the governance quality 
RI EDGO\ JRYHUQHG ÀUPV4XRWDV IRUFHG UHMXYHQDWLRQ RI ERDUGV
along the gender lines and disrupted the established norms and 
hierarchies in the market place. 
Some countries opted for the disclosure strategy. United States, 
with the largest share of global market capitalization, mandated the 
disclosure of board diversity in a SEC reporting ruling; however, 
the ruling left it to corporations to interpret the meaning of 
“diversity”. 
While Norway and the US used formal legislation and regulation, 
many countries adopted less formal approaches, so called soft-law 
mechanisms embedded in corporate governance codes, such as 
Turkey.
Despite the various global, regional and country-level interventions, 
the progress in improving the gender diversity of the boards has 
been very slow and incremental1.
,:'·VSXUSRVHLVWRFUHDWHDZDUHQHVVRQWKHEHQHÀWVRIERDUG
diversity with respect to gender, develop and maintain a database 
RITXDOLÀHGZRPHQDQGPDWFKWKHZRPHQLQWKHGDWDEDVHZLWK
companies wishing to nominate women directors to their boards.
1.2 Why gender diversity?
Initial arguments in support of regulatory interventions to achieve 
gender parity were predominantly based on economic rationale 
while equality based arguments were somewhat less pronounced. 
The dominant perspective is based on the corporate governance 
argument that gender diversity at the board level may increase 
the effectiveness of a board’s monitoring duties. A diverse board 
can help avoid “group think” and the presence of different 
perspectives on the board may lead to better assessment of risks. 
Various empirical studies provide evidence for this argument. A 
somewhat supporting perspective suggests that women promote 
better understanding of markets and provide access to different 
resources and networks. Accordingly, diversity enhances creativity 
and innovation, while also contributing to the external legitimacy 
RIWKHÀUP
As the debate matured, the arguments shifted their focus 
IURP HFRQRPLF UDWLRQDOHV WKDW GLYHUVLÀHG ERDUGVPD\ HQKDQFH
organizational performance, to equality-based arguments, 
that is to the goals of equitable access to positions of power 
DQG GHPRFUDWL]LQJ SRZHU7KLV VKLIW UHÁHFWV WKH FKDQJH LQ WKH
conception of the purpose of the corporation, from purely 
maximizing the wealth of shareholders, to also caring for and 
promoting general social welfare. As such, the issue of gender 
diversity in the boardroom has become a political one while the 
lack of women in the upper echelons of business organizations is 
considered an indication of a problematic relationship between 
gender and economic decision-making. 
The debate continues and evolves. As we learn more about 
how different strategies led to different outcomes and whether 
they delivered the desired outcomes, we may expect changes in 
preferred strategies. Some countries are already revaluating their 
approaches.  
1  GMI Ratings http://www3.gmiratings.com/home/2013/05/gmi-ratings-
2013-women-on-boards-survey. 
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About The Forum
Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey (CGFT), founded on 
1st of March 2003 as a joint initiative of Turkish Industrialists’ 
DQG%XVLQHVVPHQ·V$VVRFLDWLRQ786,$'DQG6DEDQFÖ8QLYHUVLW\
continues its’ work as an interdisciplinary and cross sectorial 
initiative hosted by the School of Management, focusing on 
corporate behavior around issues that can impact economic 
development and social welfare. Forum’s mission is to contribute 
to the improvement of the corporate governance framework 
DQGSUDFWLFHVWKURXJKVFLHQWLÀFUHVHDUFKVXSSRUWWKHSROLF\
development process by active engagement, encourage and 
facilitate the dialogue between academicians and practitioners, 
and disseminate research for the betterment of the society and 
economic and social development.
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We have conducted an empirical research in 2013 and 2014 by 
taking advantage of Turkey’s electronic general meeting system. 
Listed companies are required to have electronic general meetings, 
which would allow all shareholders to participate in the meeting 
electronically. The set up allows the shareholders to send their 
questions as an electronic message to the management. Those 
questions must be answered either during the assembly or within 
a month following the meeting. Individual investors have bought 
shares in the companies with all male boards, participated in their 
electronic annual general meetings and asked the companies 
to explain their strategy with respect to the gender diversity 
recommendation of the CMBT.  In 2013, 36% of the companies 
LQFOXGHGLQRXUUHVHDUFKZHUHQRWDZDUHRIWKHUXOLQJ7KLVÀJXUH
was 40% in the 2014 sample. We report “no change” in the level 
of awareness of companies with respect to the gender diversity 
recommendations.
1.3 Turkey 
Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMBT), the market regulator, 
adopted a soft law approach to gender diversity by a new ruling 
in January 2012, which recommended that the listed companies 
have at least one woman on their boards. The companies largely 
ignored this recommendation in 2012 board elections. In 2013, 
CMBT has revised its recommendation by asking the companies 
to set and disclose a voluntary target level of women on boards, 
which should not be less than 25%, by a target date they specify.  
2XUÀQGLQJVSUHVHQWHGLQ6HFWLRQVKRZWKDWWKHVRIWODZDSSURDFK
to promote gender diversity did not work in Turkey despite 
the efforts of various initiatives, including Independent Women 
Directors Project (IWD), as the overall percentage of women on 
boards has increased only a few basis points. However, we observe 
an increase in the ratio of women appointed to independent 
directorship roles, which suggests that the IWD project might 
have had an effect on new appointments. This increase is balanced 
ZLWKDGHFUHDVHLQQRQH[HFXWLYHIHPDOHGLUHFWRUVDIÀOLDWHGZLWK
the controlling families. This may be an indication of improvements 
in the effectiveness of Turkey’s corporate boards, but further 
research is needed to verify this interpretation. 
Ingibjorg Gisladottir, 
UN Women Regional Director for Europe and Central Asia, Representative to Turkey 
“Women make up 24 percent of senior management globally, a proportion 
which may have been unthinkable in the past. We see now more women 
as CEOs of companies and managers. However, there are still glass ceilings. 
We need a lot more representation of women in senior decision-making 
mechanisms in the work-place. The board of directors is one crucial area where 
women – as agents of change – can make a difference with a direct voice in 
setting the corporate agenda. This will advance gender equality in businesses 
ERHIRWYVIIJ½GMIRG]F]GVIEXMRKEQSVIMRGPYWMZIGSVTSVEXIGYPXYVI-XGEREPWS
QEOIGSQTERMIWQSVITVS½XEFPIEWEWXYH]SR*SVXYRIGSQTERMIW[MXL
track records of raising women to senior positions shows.” 
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Section 2
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India:;OL*VTWHUPLZ(J[LUHJ[LKPUTHUKH[LZ[OH[
HSSJVTWHUPLZ SPZ[LKVUZ[VJRL_JOHUNLZT\Z[OH]LH[ SLHZ[
VUL^VTHUVUP[ZIVHYKVMKPYLJ[VYZ
Canada: 0MLUHJ[LK[OL)VHYKZVM+PYLJ[VYZ4VKLYUPaH[PVU
(J[^PSS YLX\PYLKJVTWHUPLZ [VOH]LH[ SLHZ[TLUHUK
^VTLUVU[OLPYIVHYKZVMKPYLJ[VYZ
European Union: 0U5V]LTILY[OL,<OHZ]V[LKI`
THQVYP[`PUMH]V\YVM[OLWYVWVZLKTHUKH[VY`X\V[HZVU
[OLU\TILYVM^VTLUVUL_LJ\[P]LIVHYKZ
France: ;OLUL^IPSSHKVW[LKPU1\S`JVUÄYTLK[OLSH^
[OH[YLX\PYLZSHYNLJVTWHUPLZSPZ[LKVU[OLZ[VJRL_JOHUNL[V
OH]LH[ SLHZ[MLTHSL YLWYLZLU[H[PVUVU [OLPYIVHYKZI`

 Canada: 0U  6U[HYPH :LJ\YP[PLZ *VTTPZZPVU
KYHM[LKJVTWS`VYL_WSHPUY\SLZ[OH[^PSSYLX\PYLJVTWHUPLZ
[V KPZJSVZL [OLPY [HYNL[Z MVY [OL YLWYLZLU[H[PVU VM MLTHSL
KPYLJ[VYZVU[OLPYL_LJ\[P]LIVHYKZ
Netherlands:(JJVYKPUN[VJVTWS`VYL_WSHPUX\V[HY\SLZ
[OH[JHTLPU[VLќLJ[PUSHYNLJVTWHUPLZT\Z[Z[YP]L
[VOH]LH[SLHZ[VM[OLZLH[ZPU[OLPYIVHYKVMKPYLJ[VYLZ
HUKPU[OLPYZ\WLY]PZVY`IVHYKOLSKI`^VTLUHUKH[SLHZ[
VM[OLZLH[ZI`TLU
Germany: 0U5V]LTILY.LYTHU`HNYLLKVUWSHUZ
[VPU[YVK\JLHX\V[HMVYZ\WLY]PZVY`IVHYKZVMW\ISPJS`
[YHKLKJVTWHUPLZI`VUHJVTWS`VYL_WSHPUIHZPZ
Japan OHZH]VS\U[HY`[HYNL[MVYPUJYLHZPUN[OLU\TILYVM
^VTLUPUL_LJ\[P]LWVZP[PVUZ[VI`
UK YLJVTTLUKZ[OH[JVTWHUPLZZOV\SKHPTMVYHTPUPT\T
MLTHSLYLWYLZLU[H[PVUI`;OL*S\IHNYV\W
VMJOHPYTLUPZ]VS\U[HYPS`JVTTP[[LK[VPUJYLHZPUN^VTLU»Z
YLWYLZLU[H[PVUPUJVTWHU`IVHYKZI`
 Australia: (\Z[YHSPHU 0UZ[P[\[L VM *VTWHU` +PYLJ[VYZ
OHZ H TLU[VYPUN WYVNYHT MVY ^VTLU [V HJOPL]L NYLH[LY
YLWYLZLU[H[PVUVM^VTLUVUIVHYKZ0UHKKP[PVU>VTLU6U
)VHYKZ >6) 0UP[PH[P]L WYV]PKLZ IVHYK [YHPUPUN WYVNYHTZ
HUKJSHZLZZMVY^VTLUPU[OLJVYWVYH[LSPUL
Legislative Quotas: 
.V]LYUTLU[X\V[HZMVY[OLU\TILYVM^VTLUYLX\PYLK[V
IL PU [OLIVHYKYVVT^LYL PUP[PHSS` PU[YVK\JLKI`5VY^H`
 PU  HUK ^HZ MVSSV^LK I` V[OLY JV\U[YPLZ
:VTL JV\U[YPLZ LN 5VY^H ` -YHUJL 0[HS` HUK )LSNP\T
LUHJ[LKM\SSÅLKNLKX\V[HSLNPZSH[PVUZMVYJVTWHU`IVHYKZ
[OH[ PUJS\KL ZHUJ[PVUZ :VTL V[OLY JV\U[YPLZ ZL[ NLUKLY
YLX\PYLTLU[Z ZWLJPÄJHSS` MVY JVTWVZP[PVU VM IVHYKZ VM
Z[H[LV^ULKJVTWHUPLZVYT\UPJPWHSHUKWYV]PUJPHSX\V[HZ
LN 0ZYHLS :V\[O (MYPJH +LUTHYR -PUKSHUK 3LNPZSH[P]L
TLHZ\YLZHYL]PL^LKHZJVU[YV]LYZPHSI`THU `^ OPSLV[OLYZ
HYN\L[OH[HJOPL]PUNIHSHUJLKIVHYKWHY[PJPWH[PVUIL[^LLU
^VTLUHUKTLU^PSSILZSV^^P[OV\[Z[PT\SH[PUNTLHZ\YLZ
HUKZWLJPÄJHSS`X\V[HZ>LWYLZLU[OLYLZVTLVM[OLYLJLU[
KL]LSVWTLU[ZZPUJLV\YYLWVY[
Comply-or-Explain Mechanisms, Voluntary Targets, 
Enabling Initiatives:
:VTLJV\U[YPLZJOVVZL[VLUJV\YHNLNLUKLYKP]LYZP[`VU
JVTWHU` [OYV\NOJVTWS`VYL_WSHPUTLJOHUPZTZHSPNULK
^P[O JVYWVYH[L NV]LYUHUJL JVKLZ *VTWS`VYL_WSHPU
KPZJSVZ\YL MYHTL^VYRZ HSSV^ NV]LYUTLU[Z [V ZL[ [HYNL[Z
MVY SPZ[LKJVTWHUPLZI\[HSZVHSSV^ [OLT [VL_WSHPU [OLPY
ZP[\H[PVUPUJHZLVMUVUJVTWSPHUJL:\JOHWWYVHJOLZHYL
Z\WWVY[LKTVZ[S` HZ [OL` YLJVNUPaL [OL \UPX\L ZP[\H[PVU
MHJPUN PUKP]PK\HS I\ZPULZZLZ HZ VWWVZLK [V YLN\SH[VY`
X\V[HZ:VTLJV\U[YPLZOH]LZL[]VS\U[HY`[HYNL[ZMVYSPZ[LK
JVTWHUPLZ PU [OL MVYTVM YLJVTTLUKH[PVUZ MVYTPUPT\T
SL]LSZ VM MLTHSL IVHYKTLTILY YLWYLZLU[H[PVU ,ќVY[Z [V
PUJYLHZL ^VTLU»Z YLWYLZLU[H[PVU PU [OL IVHYKYVVT HYL
HSZV Z\WWVY[LK I` NV]LYUTLU[HS UVUNV]LYUTLU[HS HUK
PU[LYNV]LYUTLU[HSPUP[PH[P]LZ
Corporate efforts: 
:VTL JVTWHUPLZ HYL HSZV PTWSLTLU[PUN Z[YH[LNPLZ [V
YLK\JL[OLNLUKLYNHWVU[OLPYIVHYKZ
 Barclays THKL H W\ISPJ JVTTP[TLU[ [V PUJYLHZL [OL
YLWYLZLU[H[PVUVM^VTLU PUZLUPVYWVZP[PVUZ MYVT[V
I` )HYJSH`Z HSZV OHZ H IVHYKKP]LYZP[` WVSPJ`
^P[OH[HYNL[VMHJOPL]PUNMLTHSLYLWYLZLU[H[PVUVU[OL
IVHYKVMKPYLJ[VYZI`
 Lloyds Banking Group OHZ H W\ISPJ JVTTP[TLU[ [V
PUJYLHZL[OLYLWYLZLU[H[PVUVM^ VTLUPUZLUPVYTHUHNLTLU[
WVZP[PVUZ[VI`
Sources:  Women on boards Davies Review Annual Report 2014, 2013 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Directors,  Catalyst Knowledge Centre, 2014
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Mehmet Göçmen, 
Chairman, Corporate Governance Association of Turkey
“Women’s participation in economic decision-making processes has become 
a crucial topic at the global agenda. We, as the Corporate Governance 
Association of Turkey, believe that a gender-balanced democratic board that 
[SVOWIJ½GMIRXP]MWOI]JSVKSSHGSVTSVEXIKSZIVRERGI±-RHITIRHIRX;SQIR
(MVIGXSVW 4VSNIGX² MRMXMEXIH F] 7EFERGÒ 9RMZIVWMX] 'SVTSVEXI +SZIVRERGI
Forum and supported by the Swedish Government will play a vital role to 
raise awareness on this important issue and help women directors to enhance 
their capabilities.
%WE GMZMP WSGMIX]SVKERMWEXMSR[SVOMRK MR XLMW ½IPH[I WXVSRKP]FIPMIZI XLEX
Corporate Governance should be seen as an integral part of the management 
culture, not a box ticking exercise. Hence, we should encourage higher standards 
of corporate governance and make sure businesses recognise core principles 
and exercise their responsibilities. 
We are all aware that lack of good governance leads to waste of time, energy, 
and resources for businesses and society. We know from international trends 
and our experience that gender-balanced boards can help prevent bad 
management practices.” 
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In 2014, there were 422 companies listed in BIST, compared to 
427 in 2013. Accordingly the number of board seats in 2014 was 
slightly decreased to 2953 in from 3002 in 2013.
We have accessed the board data on each company from company 
ZHEVLWHVDQGWKH3XEOLF'LVFORVXUH3ODWIRUP7KHGDWDUHÁHFWVWKH
information disclosed by the companies up until 31 of August 
2014. 
3.1 Overview of Board Seats
The IWD Project annually reports the progress and trends in the 
gender diversity of Turkey’s corporate boards. The data shows 
how companies have been responding to the changes in corporate 
governance regulations that came into effect 2012. According to 
the new recommendatory rules and principles issued by CMBT, at 
least 1/3 of the members of board of directors must be independent 
board members. It is also recommended that companies should 
aim for a minimum of 25% female representation and report their 
progress annually.
In response, as seen in Table 3.1, the number of companies without 
DQ LQGHSHQGHQWERDUGPHPEHUKDVGHFUHDVHGVLJQLÀFDQWO\VLQFH
2013.
Table 3.1: Overview of companies that have independent directors on their boards in 
2014 and 2013
Number of Companies (#)
2014 2013
Companies with 1 independent board member 4 5
Companies with 2 independent board members 313 313
Companies with 3 independent board members 49 40
Companies with 4 independent board members 17 14
Companies with 5 or more independent board members 3 4
In 2014, independent board members held 29.1% of board seats 
compared to 27.7% in 2013 and 24.3% in 2012. As shown in Table 
3.2, while there was an increase in total independent directorships 
from 2013 to 2014, there was no change in the number of female-
held directorships in 2014 compared to 2013. The number of 
female directorships was 352 in both 2013 and 2014, and the 
percentage of female-held directorships increased only 0.2% in 
2014. These rates suggest that soft law approach is not 
effective in the Turkish context.
Table 3.2: Overview of female-held directorships as a percentage of all BIST board 
seats and independent female directorships as a percentage of all BIST independent 
directors in 2014, 2013 and 2012
2014 2013 2012
Number 
(#)
% of 
total 
seats
Number 
(#)
% of 
total 
seats
Number 
(#)
% of 
total 
seats
Total number of board seats 2953 - 3002 - 2766 -
Female-held directorships 352 11.9% 352 11.7% 319 11.5%
Independent directorships 860 29.1% 831 27.7% 673 24.3%
The total number of independent board members increased from 
831 to 860 in 2014, as shown in Table 3.3. While there was no 
change in the total number of female-held directorships, there 
was a positive change in the ratio of female directorships within 
the independent directors category. The total number of female 
directorships on BIST boards was 80 in 2014, an increase from 73 
in 2013. There were 29 new independent directorships in 2014, 
24% of these new appointments were given to women. These 
ÀJXUHVVXJJHVW WKDWUHJXODWLRQVDQG ,:'SURMHFWKDGDSRVLWLYH
impact on the percentage of new appointments for independent 
directorships going to women.
Table 3.3: Breakdown of male and female independent directorships on BIST boards in 
2014, 2013, and 2012
2014 2013 2012
Number 
(#) % 
Number 
(#) % 
Number 
(#) % 
Total number of independent 
directorships 860 - 831 - 673 -
Independent female directorships 80 9.3% 73 8.8% 52 7.7%
Independent male directorships 780 90.7% 758 91.2% 621 92.3%
3.2 Overview of BIST 
Companies with Female 
Directors 
As shown in Table 3.4, 44.5% of BIST companies have not yet 
appointed female directors as of the cut-off date in 2014. In other 
words, 190 important companies in the Turkish economy still do 
not have any women on their boards. The number of companies 
with a female chair remained the same as last year’s results, and 
the number of companies with two or more female members 
decreased in 2014, only 6.2% of companies have more than two 
women on their boards.
(YHQWKRXJKWKHUHKDVQRWEHHQDVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHLQWKHQXPEHU
of female directors in 2014, there has been a considerable change in 
the number of companies that have independent female directors 
on their boards. Table 3.4 shows that companies are beginning to 
appoint professional women to their boards; overall, companies 
with female independent members have shown an increase from 
15.7% in 2013 to 18% in 2014.
Table 3.4: Overview of BIST companies with female directors in 2014, 2013, and 2012
2014 2013 2012
Number 
(#)
% of 
companies
Number 
(#)
% of 
companies
Number 
(#)
% of 
companies
Number of companies 422 - 427 - 412 -
Companies with at least 1 
female member 236 55.9% 237 55.5% 218 52.9%
Companies with at least 3 
female members 26 6.2% 30 7.0% 25 6.1%
Companies with no female 
members 186 44.1% 190 44.5% 194 47.1%
Companies with female chair 25 5.9% 25 5.9% 23 5.6%
Companies with female board 
member CEO 13 3.1% 12 2.8% 20 4.9%
Companies with female 
independent members 76 18% 67 15.7% 46 11.2%
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3.3 Breakdown of Female 
Directors on BIST Boards
Table 3.5 shows the trends in the numbers of female directors in 
2012, 2013, and 2014. While there was no change in the number 
of female-held directorships in 2014, there has been an increase 
in the percentage of independent female directorships from 
20.7% in 2013 to 22.7% in 2014. We believe that the IWD Project 
has contributed to this change. Since 2012, the total number of 
independent women directorships on BIST boards has increased 
every year. 
7DEOH IXUWKHU LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKHUHKDVQRWEHHQDVLJQLÀFDQW
change in the number of executive female directorships in 2014. 
Indeed, there was only a marginal increase in the number of 
executive female directorships—executive female directors held 
only 19.3% of all board seats in 2014. Furthermore, the number of 
IHPDOHGLUHFWRUVZKRDUHHLWKHUDIÀOLDWHGZLWKDFRQWUROOLQJIDPLO\
or shareholder has not changed in 2014 compared with 2013; 
they held 50.9% of all board seats in 2014. 
Table 3.5: Overview of female-held directorships on BIST boards in 2014, 2013, and 
2012
2014 2013 2012
Number 
(#)
% of 
female 
directors
Number 
(#)
% of 
female 
directors
Number 
(#)
% of 
female 
directors
Female-held directorships 352 - 352 - 319 -
Independent female directorships 80 22.7% 73 20.7% 52 16.3%
Non-executive female 
directorships 204 58.0% 210 59.7% 191 59.9%
Non-executive female 
directorships (women either 
DI¿OLDWHGZLWKWKHFRQWUROOLQJ
family or shareholder)
133 37.8% 134 38.1% 133 41.7%
Other non-executive female 
directorships 71 20.2% 76 21.9% 58 18.1%
Executive female directorships 68 19.3% 69 19.6% 76 23.8%
Executive female directorships 
ZRPHQHLWKHUDI¿OLDWHGZLWKWKH
FRQWUROOLQJIDPLO\RUVKDUHKROGHU
46 13.1% 45 12.8% 44 13.8%
Other executive female 
directorships 22 6.3% 24 6.8% 32 10.0%
All female directors either 
DI¿OLDWHGZLWKFRQWUROOLQJIDPLO\RU
shareholder
179 50.9% 179 50.9% 177 55.5%
3.4 Composition of Board 
Committees 
Table 3.6 provides an overview of committee seats occupied by 
independent directors. Audit Committee has been mandatory 
since 2003 whereas Corporate Governance Committee became 
mandatory in 2012. According to regulations, audit committees 
must consist of only independent directors whereas only the 
majority of corporate governance committee members are 
required to be independent. Nomination and Compensation 
Committees are required but companies can assign the roles of 
these committees to the Corporate Governance Committee. The 
number of seats occupied by independent directors increased in 
2014. Additionally, female directors make up 9.5% of committee 
seats in 2014, an increase from 8.5% in 2013.  However, independent 
male directors still hold a vast majority of the committee seats in 
2014, representing 90.5% of all seats.
Table 3.6: Overview and breakdown of independent members on board committees in 
2014 and 2013
Percentages and numbers have been calculated based on data from 384 companies (out of 422) 
WKDWKDYHLGHQWLÀHGRUGLVFORVHGWKHLUFRPPLWWHHVXSXQWLO$XJXVW
2014 2013
Number 
(#) %
Number 
(#) %
Seats occupied by independent directors on committees 800 - 714 -
Independent female directors on committees 76 9.5% 61 8.5%
Independent male directors on committees 724 90.5% 653 91.5%
Seats occupied by independent directors on audit 
committees 728 - 648 -
Independent female directors on audit committees 69 9.5% 53 8.2%
Independent male directors on audit committees 659 90.5% 595 91.8%
Seats occupied by independent directors on corporate 
JRYHUQDQFHFRPPLWWHHV 505 - 428 -
Independent female directors 
RQFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHFRPPLWWHHV 45 8.9% 30 7.01%
Independent male directors 
RQFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHFRPPLWWHHV 460 91.1% 398 93.0%
Seats occupied by independent directors on risk committees 422 - - -
Independent female directors on risk committees 39 9.2% - -
Independent male directors on risk committees 383 90.8% - -
The number of audit committee seats occupied by women 
members has increased from 59 in 2013 to 73 in 2014 (Table 
3.7). Out of 73 female directors sitting on audit committees in 
2014, four are not independent members. Female independent 
directors are more likely to be represented in committees: 95% 
of the independent women directors sit on committees whereas 
only 84% of male directors are on committees.
Table 3.7: Women on board committees in 2014, 2013, and 2012
Percentages and numbers have been calculated based on data from 384 companies (out of 422) 
WKDWKDYHLGHQWLÀHGRUGLVFORVHGWKHLUFRPPLWWHHVXSXQWLO$XJXVW
2014 2013 2012
Number 
(#)
% of total 
committee 
seats
Number 
(#)
% of total 
committee 
seats
Number 
(#)
Total number of Audit Committee 
Seats 778 - 707 - -
Audit Committee Seats Occupied by 
Female Directors 73 9.4 59 8.4% 54
Audit Committee Seats Occupied by 
Independent Directors 728 - 648 91.7%
Audit Committee Seats Occupied by 
Independent Female Directors 69 9.5 53 7.5%
Total number of Corporate 
Governance Committee Seats 892 - 793 - -
Corporate Governance Committee Seats 
Occupied by Female Directors 95 10.7 80 10.1% 65
Corporate Governance Committee Seats 
Occupied by Independent Directors 505 - 428 54.0%
Corporate Governance Committee Seats 
Occupied by Independent Women Directors 45 8.9 30 3.8%
Table 3.7 also shows that women are slightly better represented 
in Corporate Governance Committees compared to Audit 
Committees: 10.7% of Corporate Governance Committee seats 
are occupied by female directors in comparison to 9.4% of Audit 
Committee seats. Furthermore, there was an increase in the 
percentage of Corporate Governance Committee seats occupied 
by independent female directors from 3.8% in 2013 to 4.7% in 
2014. Less than half of the female directors sitting on Corporate 
Governance Committees are independent members.
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3.5 New Appointments
Table 3.10 provides an overview of the changes in new 
appointments and resignations of women on boards. Of the 85 
new female appointees to the BIST boards, more than half were 
appointed to non-executive directorships. 
5HVLJQDWLRQÀJXUHVVKRZWKDWPRVWRIWKHIHPDOHGLUHFWRUVZKR
KDYHUHVLJQHGKDYHEHHQDIÀOLDWHGZLWKWKHFRQWUROOLQJIDPLOLHV
Table 3.10: New Appointments and Resignations in 2014
2014
Number 
(#) %
APPOINTMENTS
&KDQJHLQWRWDOQXPEHURIGLUHFWRUVKLSVLQ%,67 -49 -
New female board appointments 85 -
New independent female appointments 24 28.2%
New non-executive female appointments 49 57.7%
New executive female appointments 12 14.1%
1HZIHPDOHDSSRLQWPHQWVZRPHQHLWKHUDI¿OLDWHGZLWKWKH
FRQWUROOLQJIDPLO\RUVKDUHKROGHU 33 -
1HZH[HFXWLYHIHPDOHDSSRLQWPHQWVZRPHQHLWKHUDI¿OLDWHG
ZLWKWKHFRQWUROOLQJIDPLO\RUVKDUHKROGHU 6 18.2%
New non-executive female appointments (women either 
DI¿OLDWHGZLWKWKHFRQWUROOLQJIDPLO\RUVKDUHKROGHU 27 81.8%
RESIGNATIONS
)HPDOHERDUGUHVLJQDWLRQV 85 -
,QGHSHQGHQWIHPDOHUHVLJQDWLRQV 16 18.8%
1RQH[HFXWLYHIHPDOHUHVLJQDWLRQV 55 64.7%
([HFXWLYHIHPDOHUHVLJQDWLRQV 14 16.5%
)HPDOHUHVLJQDWLRQVZRPHQHLWKHUDI¿OLDWHGZLWKWKH
FRQWUROOLQJIDPLO\RUVKDUHKROGHU 38 -
([HFXWLYHIHPDOHUHVLJQDWLRQVZRPHQHLWKHUDI¿OLDWHGZLWK
WKHFRQWUROOLQJIDPLO\RUVKDUHKROGHU 8 21.1%
1RQH[HFXWLYHIHPDOHUHVLJQDWLRQVZRPHQHLWKHUDI¿OLDWHG
ZLWKWKHFRQWUROOLQJIDPLO\RUVKDUHKROGHU 30 78.9%
NET INCREASE IN FEMALE DIRECTORS 0 0%
3.6 Trends in BIST-100
The changes in the representation of women in the largest listed 
companies in Turkey, included in BIST-100 index, are presented in 
Table 3.11. As listed below, the percentage of women on boards 
has decreased from 11.25% in 2013 to 10.32% in 2014. There was 
QRVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJH LQ WKHSHUFHQWDJHVRI%,67FRPSDQLHV
with one or more female members on their boards in 2014. 
Table 3.11: Changes to the ratio of women in BIST 100 companies between 2008–2014
2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
:RPHQRQ%RDUGV 10.32% 11.25% 10.02% 10.88% 9.82% 8.77% 8.63%
Companies with at least 1 
female member 62 63 54 - - - -
Companies with at least 3 
female members 6 9 6 - - - -
Companies with no female 
members 38 37 46 - - - -
Companies with female chair 7 7 7 - - - -
Banks are subject to different regulations in Turkey with respect 
to mandatory board committees. In addition to the Audit and 
Corporate Governance Committees, banks must have a Credit 
Committee. Table 3.8 shows that the representation of women 
in Credit Committees of banks is only 9.2%. The total number 
of credit committee seats increased in 2014, the number of 
women in credit committees increased by only a single seat. We 
do not report the independent directors in Credit Committees 
for banks since corporate governance regulations categorize all 
credit committee members as independent regardless of their 
compliance with the independence criteria that is applicable to all 
other companies. 
Table 3.8: Women on credit committees (banks only) in 2014 and 2013
Percentages and numbers have been calculated based on data from 389 companies (out of 427) 
WKDWKDYHLGHQWLÀHGWKHLUFRPPLWWHHVDVRI$XJXVW
2014 2013
Number 
(#)
% of total 
Credit 
committee 
seats
Number 
(#)
% of total 
Credit 
committee 
seats
Total number of Credit 
Committee Seats 65 - 54 -
Credit Committee Seats 
Occupied by Women 6 9.2% 5 9.3%
Table 3.9 demonstrates that women directors are increasingly 
likely to serve as chairs on Corporate Governance Committees, 
Audit Committees, and Risk Committees. The percentage of 
women holding committee chair seats has increased year by year. 
However, women are still less likely to serve as Risk Committee 
chairs in banks.
Table 3.9: Overview of female directorships as a percentage of all BIST board seats 
and independent female directorships as a percentage of all BIST independent 
directors in 2014, 2013, and 2012
Percentages and numbers have been calculated based on data from 389 companies (out of 427) 
WKDWKDYHLGHQWLÀHGWKHLUFRPPLWWHHVDVRI$XJXVW
2014 2013 2012
Number 
(#)
% of 
companies
Number 
(#)
% of 
companies
Number 
(#)
% of 
companies
Number of companies 422 - 353 - 412 -
Companies with a Female 
Audit Committee Chair 26 6.2% 20 5.7% 18 4.4%
Companies with a Female 
Corporate Governance 
Committee Chair
22 5.2% 14 4.0% 11 2.7%
Companies with a female 
credit committee Chair 
(for banks only)
1 4.0% 0 0% - -
Companies with a female risk 
committee chair 22 5.2% - - - -
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3.7 Women and Men holding 
Multiple Directorships
According to 2014 data, 273 women hold 352 directorships on BIST 
boards. The percentage of women holding multiple directorships is 
19.4% (53 out of 273), and the percentage of men holding multiple 
directorships is 17.5% (360 out of 2053). Compared with 2013 
(17.9%), women held more multiple directorships in 2014.
Table 3.12: Women and men holding multiple directorships in 2014
Total 
director-
ships
No of 
indi-
viduals
1 
seat
2 
seats
3
seats
4 
seats
5 
seats
6
seats
7
seats
8
seats
All directors 2953 2326 1913 280 84 25 19 3 1 1
Male directors 2601 2053 1693 242 77 19 18 2 1 1
Female directors 352 273 220 38 7 6 1 1 - -
3.8 Female Directors in 
Different Industries
Table 3.8 presents an overview of women serving on BIST 
company boards in different sectors. It makes little sense to 
draw conclusions for industries in which less than a dozen listed 
companies are operating (e.g. mining; agriculture, wood products 
DQGÀVKLQJHWF)RUWKHUHPDLQLQJVHFWRUVWKHUHLVQRVLJQLÀFDQW
difference in women’s representation on boards between different 
industries, where the sector has more than 30 companies. 
Table 3.13: Female directors in different industries in 2014
Total # of 
companies
Companies with 
female directors
Total # of 
director-
ships
Female 
directorships
# # % # # %
Education, Health, Sports 
and Other Social Services 5 0 0% 36 0 0
Electricity Gas and Water 5 4 80% 35 5 14.3%
(QHUJ\ 1 0 0% 12 0 0%
Administrative and Support 
Services 2 1 50% 11 2 18.2%
0DQXIDFWXULQJ,QGXVWU\ 189 106 56.1% 1306 150 11.5%
Construction and Public 
Works 8 2 25% 49 3 6.1%
0LQLQJ 5 4 80% 34 5 14.7%
Financial Institutions 140 83 59.3% 1018 133 13.1%
3URIHVVLRQDO6FLHQWL¿FDQG
Technical Activities 1 1 100% 4 1 25%
$JULFXOWXUH:RRG3URGXFWV
DQG)LVKLQJ 4 3 75% 22 7 31.8%
7HFKQRORJ\DQG'HIHQFH 16 8 50% 107 13 12.2%
Wholesale and Retail Trade, 
Hotels and Restaurants 35 20 57.1% 238 29 12.2%
Transportation, Telecom-
PXQLFDWLRQDQG6WRUDJH 11 4 36.4% 81 4 4.9%
Edwin Smelt, 
Co-Chair of the Diversity Council, Egon Zehnder
“There is encouraging news in the 
2014 Egon Zehnder European 
Board Diversity Analysis, which 
found that only 7.6% of the more 
XLER PEVKIGSQTER])YVSTIER
boards studied include no women 
members (as contrasted with the 
32.2% with no women members in 2006). Further, in 
2014 more than 20% of the directors on European 
boards are female.
In Turkey, we found that 10.8% of large company board 
positions are held by women, which is just below 
XLI KPSFEP EZIVEKI SJ QSVI XLER  PEVKI GSQTER]
boards Egon Zehnder studied worldwide, as a basis for 
comparison. Clearly there is much work yet to be done 
– everywhere! 
As we partner with boards in Turkey, across Europe, and 
around the world, we see a growing recognition that 
diversity of viewpoints, backgrounds, and perspectives is 
an essential strategic advantage in the global economy. 
8SQSVI JYPP] VIEPM^I XLI XERKMFPI FIRI½XW SJ HMZIVWMX]
everyone must broaden their horizons, actively seeking 
enhanced understanding and fresh collaborations for 
mutual advantage. CEOs in particular must lead the 
way to recruit, retain and integrate female top talent in 
organizational cultures that have only begun to change.
Egon Zehnder is proud to be a partner of the 
Independent Women Directors (IWD) project and an 
active participant in Turkey’s pursuit of diversity, working 
JVSQSYVSJ½GIMR-WXERFYPSTIRIHMRWXVEXIKMGEPP]
situated at the crossroads of East and West”
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Most research on female directors report women on boards 
as a percentage of total number of directors. Global statistics 
reported by various research institutes (e.g. Catalyst, CWDI and 
GMI) are based on different and generally very small sample sizes 
and comparisons between countries must be read with caution. 
In presenting statistics on women on boards in Turkey, we use the 
same methodology (with a minor revision)1 as in 2013 explained 
below. 
4.1 Classifying Women 
Directors
First of all, we differentiate female directors who sit on the boards 
as direct shareholders or representatives of controlling families 
from professional female directors. In many cases, the controlling 
IDPLO\ EDVHG RQ IDPLO\ FRQVWLWXWLRQ RU WUDGLWLRQ LGHQWLÀHV WKH
members who would represent the family on the board. Those 
nominations are primarily based on inheritance rights, not on 
PHULWDQGTXDOLÀFDWLRQVDQGVHOHFWLRQLVIURPDVPDOOSRRORIIDPLO\
members. Although there may be a bias towards male heirs and 
presence of women on the boards contributes to the boards’ 
gender diversity, the concept of “glass ceiling” in Turkey refers 
predominantly to professional women. Therefore we classify 
woman directors as: 
 'LUHFWRUVZKRDUHPHPEHUVRIWKHFRQWUROOLQJIDPLOLHVLQ
IDPLO\FRQWUROOHGÀUPVDQGRUGLUHFWRUVZKRDUHGLUHFW
shareholders  
 3URIHVVLRQDOGLUHFWRUV
Furthermore, we classify all woman directors in accordance with 
the applicable laws and regulations in Turkey as: 
 ([HFXWLYH
 1RQH[HFXWLYHEXWQRWLQGHSHQGHQW
 ,QGHSHQGHQW
Non-executive directors may not qualify for independence when 
WKH\ DUH DIÀOLDWHGZLWK WKH FRQWUROOLQJ VKDUHKROGHUVZKHQ WKH\
KROGVLJQLÀFDQWSHUFHQWDJHRIVKDUHVLQWKHÀUPRUZKHQWKH\DUH
SURIHVVLRQDOVDIÀOLDWHGZLWKRWKHUÀUPV LI WKHÀUPEHORQJV WRD
business group.
4.2 Calculating Diversity  
We are interested in “diversity” as well “female presence”. 
Therefore, we measure gender diversity using Blau’s (1977) index 
of heterogeneity. For gender diversity, Blau’s index can range from 
zero (when there is only one gender on the board) to 0.50 (when 
1 The main difference from 2013 calculation is the expansion of Chair Power  
variable to include female CEOs as well as female chairs.
there are equal numbers of men and women). Gender Diversity 
Index (GDI) values of BIST companies, including only national 
market and BIST 100, are presented in Appendix A and the top 
scoring companies are listed in Table 4.1.
4.3 Calculating Power
We take into consideration not only the presence but also the 
LQÁXHQFH RI ZRPHQ RQ ERDUGV 3RZHU UHSUHVHQWV WKH DELOLW\
WR H[HUW LQÁXHQFH RQ GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ:H GHÀQH ÀYH VRXUFHV
RI FRPSDUDWLYH SRZHU DV ¶LQÁXHQFH YDULDEOHV· DGRSWHG IURP
Finkelstein’s taxonomy (1992):
 3UHVHQFHRI:RPHQ:SHUFHQWDJHRIIHPDOHGLUHFWRUVLQ
the board) 
 &RPPLWWHH0HPEHUVKLS:%&SHUFHQWDJHRIVHDWVRFFXSLHG
by women in all board committees) 
 3URIHVVLRQDO$XWKRULW\:3SHUFHQWDJHRIIHPDOHGLUHFWRUV
among all professional directors - professional directors 
exclude family members and shareholders)
 ,QGHSHQGHQFH3RZHU:,SHUFHQWDJHRILQGHSHQGHQWIHPDOH
directors among all independent directors) 
 &KDLU&(23RZHU:&SHUFHQWDJHRIZRPHQLQFKDLUDQG
CEO positions - this variable takes the value of 0 if the chair 
and the CEO are male, 0.5 if the CEO is on the board and 
either the CEO or the chair is a woman, 1 if the chair is 
female where the CEO is not on the board or both the CEO 
and the chair are female where the CEO is on the board) 
We also refer to previous research (Kramer, Konrad and Erkut 
2006) and use an adjustment variable for boards with more than 
two female directors by deducting two from total number of 
female directors and dividing it by the number of board members: 
(W-2)/N where N ‘s the number of board members.
:H WKHQ GHÀQH:RPHQ (PSRZHUHG %RDUG ,QGH[ :(%, DV
follows:
WEBI = a (%W) + b (%WBC) + c (% WP) + 
   d (% WI) + e (%WC) + f (W-2) / N 
There is no prior research that we can use to assign weights to 
HDFKRIWKHYDULDEOHVUHSUHVHQWLQJLQÁXHQFH,QWKHDEVHQFHRIDQ\
precedence, we used a quasi mini-Delphi method to estimate the 
weights of each variable by asking IWD Project’s Advisory Board 
members (experts in board processes) their opinions in 2013 and 
we will continue calculating two indices:
 :(%,%\JLYLQJHTXDOZHLJKWRIRQHWRDOOYDULDEOHV
(a=b=c=d=e=f=1) 
 :(%,$%\DVVLJQLQJDZHLJKWWRHDFKYDULDEOHHTXDOWRWKH
average of 8 experts’ proposed weights. 
For brevity, we only report WEBI and omit WEBI-A. In our future 
ZRUNZHLQWHQGWRHVWLPDWHWKHFRHIÀFLHQWVE\HPSLULFDOUHVHDUFK
and compare values we calculated by mini-Delphi method. 
We present GDI and WEBI values together with the percentage 
of women on board for each BIST company with at least one 
female director, in Appendix A.
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Table 4.1: Top 10 companies in Gender Diversity Index (GDI) using Blau’s 
Heterogeneity Index
Rank Company Value
1 $/&$7(//8&(177(/(7$ù7(/(.2081ø.$6<21 0.50
2 '2ö$1ùø5.(7/(5*58%8+2/'ø1* 0.49
3 087/8<$7,5,0352-(9(*$<5ø0(1.8/*(/øù7ø50( 0.49
4 7h5.78%25*%ø5$9(0$/76$1$<øø$ù 0.48
5 785&$63(752/$ù 0.48
6 0$57,27(/øù/(70(/(5ø$ù 0.48
7 '(5ø02'.21)(.6ø<21$<$..$%,'(5ø6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.48
8 %85d(/ø.%856$d(/ø.'g.h06$1$<øø 0.48
9 %85d(/ø.9$1$6$1$<øø9(7ø&$5(7 0.48
10 &5('ø7:(67)$&725ø1* 0.48
Table 4.2: Top 10 companies in Women Empowered Board Index (WEBI)
Rank Company Value
1 7h5.78%25*%ø5$9(0$/76$1$<øø$ù 2.95
2 785&$63(752/$ù 2.77
3 0$57,27(/øù/(70(/(5ø$ù 2.69
4 %85d(/ø.%856$d(/ø.'g.h06$1$<øø 2.42
5 %85d(/ø.9$1$6$1$<øø9(7ø&$5(7 2.42
6 CREDITWEST FACTORING 2.23
7 $/&$7(//8&(177(/(7$ù7(/(.2081ø.$6<21 2.16
8 0(5.2*,'$6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7$ù 1.91
9 /2*2<$=,/,06$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7$ù 1.87
10 +h55ø<(7*$=(7(&ø/ø.9(0$7%$$&,/,.$ù 1.83
Table 4.3: Top 10 companies with the highest percentage of women on board
Rank Company %
1 %85d(/ø.%856$d(/ø.'g.h06$1$<øø 60
2 %85d(/ø.9$1$6$1$<øø9(7ø&$5(7 60
3 '2ö$1ùø5.(7/(5*58%8+2/'ø1* 55
4 $/&$7(//8&(177(/(7$ù7(/(.2081ø.$6<21 50
5 087/8<$7,5,0352-(9(*$<5ø0(1.8/*(/øù7ø50( 44
6 7h5.78%25*%ø5$9(0$/76$1$<øø$ù 42
7 785&$63(752/$ù 42
8 0$57,27(/øù/(70(/(5ø$ù 42
9 '(5ø02'.21)(.6ø<21$<$..$%,'(5ø6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 42
10 CREDITWEST FACTORING 40
Table 4.4: Companies that have more than the minimum target level of 25% 
women on board
Company %
%85d(/ø.%856$d(/ø.'g.h06$1$<øø 60
%85d(/ø.9$1$6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 60
'2ö$16,5.(7/(5*58%8+2/'ø1* 55
$/&$7(//8&(177(/(7$ù7(/(.20ø1ø.$6<21 50
087/8<$7,5,0352-(9(*$<5ø0(1.8/*(/øù7ø50( 44
7h5.78%25*%ø5$9(0$/76$1$<øø 42
TURCAS PETROL 42
0$57,27(/øù/(70(/(5ø 42
'(5ø02'.21)(.6ø<21$<$..$%,'(5ø6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 42
&5(',7:(67)$.725ø1* 40
.h7$+<$3256(/(1 40
(5680(<9(9(*,'$6$1$<ø 40
0(5.2*,'$6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 33
/2*2<$=,/,06$1$<øø9(7ø&$5(7 33
+h55ø<(7*$=(7(&ø/ø.9(0$7%$$&,/,. 33
'(1ø=/ø&$06$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 33
%2<1(53(5$.(1'(9(7(.67ø/<$7,5,0/$5, 33
7(.67ø/%$1. 33
+$&,g0(56$%$1&,+2/'ø1* 33
.$5$.$ù$7/$17ø6.,<0(7/ø0$'(1/(5.8<80&8/8.
7(/(.20ø1ø.$6<216$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7
33
.2=$$/7,1øù/(70(/(5ø 33
7(.$57ø1ù$$77ø&$5(7785ø=06$1$<ø9(<$7,5,0/$5 28
3,1$5(17(*5((79(816$1$<øø 28
3,1$5686$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 28
3,1$56h70$08//(5ø6$1$<øø 28
3/$67ø..$57$.,//,.$57ø/(7øùø06ø67(0/(5ø6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 28
%2<1(5%h<h.0$ö$=$&,/,. 28
(0(.(/(.75ø.(1'h675ø6ø 28
<$7$6<$7$.9(<25*$16$1$<,, 28
*g/7$ù*g//(5%g/*(6ødø0(1726$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 28
$.,17(.67ø/ 28
$1(/(/(.75ø.352-(7$$++h79(7ø&$5(7 28
$1(/7(/(.20ø1ø.$6<21(/(.7521ø.6ø67(0/(5ø 28
*(56$1(/(.75ø.7ø&$5(79(6$1$<ø 28
<$3,9(.5('ø%$1.$6, 25
$.6$(1(5-ø 25
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5.1 Project Outcome
This report summarizes the changes in the directorships held 
by women in the boards of companies listed in BIST since 2012 
January, when the capital markets regulator CMBT amended its’
Corporate Governance Principles to recommend inclusion of 
at least one female director in listed companies’ boards. IWD 
project was launched in response to BIST companies’ ignorance of 
CMBT’s recommendation as observed during the 2012 and 2013 
JHQHUDOPHHWLQJVDQGWRKHOSOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVÀQGVXLWDEOHIHPDOH
candidates for independent directorship positions. CMBT revised 
LWVUHFRPPHQGDWLRQLQWRPDNHLWPRUHÁH[LEOH$FFRUGLQJ
to the amended version of the Principles, listed companies are 
recommended to set their own gender diversity targets and 
target dates for a minimum of 25% female representation on their 
boards, and report their progress annually. The analysis presented 
in Section 4 shows that neither the initial 2012 version nor the 
PRUHÁH[LEOHYHUVLRQZDVVXIÀFLHQWWRLPSURYHWKHJHQGHU
diversity of Turkey’s boards. In the second year of the project, 
after observing that the female representation on boards 
has risen year after year by only a few basis points, we 
conclude that there is a thick glass ceiling in Turkey 
that prevent women from reaching board directorship 
positions.
Since we launched the project, we used three methods in order to 
understand the reasons behind the lack of improvement in gender 
diversity in corporate boards:
:H KDG GLVFXVVLRQV ZLWK WKH FKDLUPDQ RI WKH ERDUG RU WKH
CEO of companies that have all-male boards to understand the 
obstacles to improving gender diversity in their boards and offer 
VXSSRUWWRÀQGVXLWDEOHIHPDOHFDQGLGDWHV
:HDQDO\]HGWKHPDQGDWRU\&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH&RPSOLDQFH
Reports to understand whether the companies have complied 
with the relevant recommendations and have set diversity targets,
:H HQJDJHGZLWK FRQFHUQHG FLWL]HQVZKR ERXJKW VKDUHV DQG
participated in annual general assemblies of companies with all-
male boards by means of the Electronic General Meeting Platform 
(e-GEM) and asked questions about their board diversity policies 
and their compliance with the CMBT’s recommendations.
Our conclusion based on the discussions we held with the 
chairmen and CEOs since we initiated the Project is that the main 
obstacle in improving gender diversity in boards is the insider-
dominated nature of the boards in Turkey. The members of 
insider-dominated boards rarely change as board seats 
are predominantly occupied by representatives of the 
FRQWUROOLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV DQG WKHLU WUXVWHG DIÀOLDWHV
Male or female, there is simply no room for outsiders in 
these entrenched boards.  While introduction of a mandatory 
quota for independent directors in 2012 created some space for 
professional directors, the appointments led to dilution of women 
even further with the addition of predominantly male independent 
directors as we have reported in our 2013 report. Furthermore, 
formally or informally staggered boards prevent rejuvenation of 
the boards. Even in the case of companies with by-laws that require 
the board stand for elections every year, the tradition/norm is to 
invite the outsiders for at least a three-year term on the basis of 
a gentlemen’s agreement. The openings in the boards in the 
future are likely to be for independent director positions 
when current directors lose their independence – that is 
in 2018: 6 years after the ruling for independent directors, 
as the legal limit for maintaining independence is 6 years.
We observe that most companies still lack a formal nomination 
process. Independent directors are invited to join the board 
on the basis of familiarity and/or social ties. Our observations 
suggest that the 2012 amendments in the Corporate Governance 
Principles, which also mandate establishment of nomination 
committees, were very timely, but poorly implemented. 
The analysis of the mandatory Corporate Governance Compliance 
Reports reveals that very few companies have set targets in 
compliance with the CMBT recommendations. There were no 
companies that reported targets above the minimum 25% and 
FRPSDQLHVWKDWVHWWDUJHWVKDYHQRWVSHFLÀHGWDUJHWGDWHV
The results of the information provided to us by the individual 
investors who participated in the electronic general assemblies 
showed that companies are sensitive to investor requests. The 
UDWLRRIFRPSDQLHVWKDWDSSRLQWHGDIHPDOHGLUHFWRUWKHÀUVWWLPH
in 2014 was higher in the sample group that received questions 
from the investors in 2013 compared to those that did not.  The 
companies included in the 2013 sample also provided more 
meaningful and positive answers to the questions on diversity in 
2014 even if they did not appoint a female director, compared to 
WKRVHZKRZHUHLQFOXGHGLQWKHH[SHULPHQWIRUWKHÀUVWWLPHLQ
2014. 
6RIW/DZ$SSURDFKWR
Corporate Governance, 
Compliance with Codes 
Most regulators in developing countries rely on market pressure 
WRSXVKWKHJRYHUQDQFHTXDOLW\RIFRPSDQLHVKLJKHU7KHGLIÀFXOWLHV
in changing and enforcing law, and the inevitable political battles 
associated with legal processes encourage governments and 
regulators to rely primarily on voluntary improvements based 
RQ´&RPSO\ RU ([SODLQµ DSSURDFK WKDW KDV EHHQ VXFFHVVIXO LQ
some countries but has delivered limited results where the 
institutional investors do not have the power and incentives to 
PRQLWRU $UDUDW  UHSRUWV WKDW WKH DSSURDFK KDG OLPLWHG
success in Turkey; companies choose to comply with provisions 
that are mandatory and easy or less costly for the controlling 
shareholders1. Recommendations that are related to control 
rights are largely disregarded.  The empirical research shows that 
compliance has been improving at a relatively low rate but had a 
VLJQLÀFDQWLPSURYHPHQWLQDIWHUWKH&0%7FKDQJHGVRPHRI
the recommendations into mandatory provisions2. 
1 Ararat, M. 2011. ‘Comply or Explain’ without consequences, the Case of Istanbul 
Stock Exchange’, 2. ed. Handbook on International Corporate Governance, 
ed. C. Mallin, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-UK, Northampton- USA.
2 Ararat, M., Black, B, and Yurtoglu, B. B. (2013) Corporate Governance, Business 
Groups, and Market Value: Evidence from Turkey. Working Paper. Mimeo.
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In Turkey foreign institutional investors own around 65% of traded 
shares whereas local institutional investors own a very small 
amount, around 4.4%. On the other hand, very few international 
investors own more than a few percent of the shares in any 
one company (IFC, 2010) that would justify monitoring. Hence 
LQYHVWRUDFWLYLVPLVKDUGO\DVLJQLÀFDQWIDFWRULQFKDQJLQJFRUSRUDWH
JRYHUQDQFH HVSHFLDOO\ ZKHQ RQH FRQVLGHUV WKH ORZ ÁRDWDWLRQ
rates at around 30%. However, the regulations that mandate the 
SUHVHQFHRILQYHVWRUUHODWLRQVGHSDUWPHQWVVWDIIHGZLWKFHUWLÀHG
FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH H[SHUWV LQ DOO OLVWHG FRPSDQLHV KHOSHG
creating an awareness around investor concerns at the board level. 
$OWKRXJKZHKDYHQRHYLGHQFHRIDQ\SUHVVXUHIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDO
institutional investors for gender diversity in the boards, our 
H[SHULPHQWDOUHVHDUFKSURYLGHVRPHHYLGHQFHWKDWERDUGVZRXOG
UHVSRQG SRVLWLYHO\ WR GHPDQGV IRU JHQGHU GLYHUVLW\ 7KH ÀUVW
evidence is quantitative: 13% of the companies that received a 
question on board’s gender diversity policies during the electronic 
general assemblies in 2013 have nominated one or more woman 
to the board in 2014 compared to 8% that did not receive such a 
TXHVWLRQLQ7KHVHFRQGHYLGHQFHLVTXDOLWDWLYH:HFODVVLÀHG
the responses to investors’ diversity related questions into three 
categories; defensive, neutral and positive.  The companies that did 
not appoint a woman to the board in 2014 but had been asked a 
question about their policy on board diversity in 2013 had more 
neutral or positive responses than defensive, compared to those 
FRPSDQLHVWKDWIDFHGVXFKDTXHVWLRQIRUWKHÀUVWWLPH
Unfortunately, Turkey’s local institutional investors have a tradition 
of not participating in general assemblies (CGFT, 2014)1. Some 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV ZLWK VLJQLÀFDQW SHUFHQWDJH
RI VKDUHV LQ%,67 FRPSDQLHV XVH SUR[\ VHUYLFHV EXW UDUHO\ DVN
TXHVWLRQV$QHFGRWDOHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQDO
investors rarely take issue with the homogenous nature of the 
ERDUGVLQ7XUNH\DOWKRXJKWKHUHDUHH[FHSWLRQV2XUH[SHULPHQW
revealed that investors would be the most effective force in 
encouraging board diversity, however it is unlikely that we will see 
VLJQLÀFDQWLQYHVWRUDFWLRQLQWKHQHDUIXWXUH
5.3 The Way Forward
When the project was launched in 2012, our objective was 
to achieve 25% female representation on Turkey’s corporate 
boards on average and at least one woman in every board by 
2016.  We have come to the conclusion that these objectives 
are not attainable based on the current legal strategies. Hence 
LQWHUYHQWLRQZRXOGEHUHTXLUHG IRUDQ\VLJQLÀFDQW LPSURYHPHQW
in the gender balance of corporate boards. Voluntary private 
initiatives that were effective in some markets such as the UK, 
or the soft law approaches that were successful in the US, do 
not seem to deliver results in Turkey. Our efforts in 2015 shall 
include working together with political parties, the government 
and the regulator to investigate the feasibility of legally binding 
gender quotas for corporate boards. We are optimistic about the 
likelihood of legally binding quotas  in Turkey since  Parliamentary 
Constitutional Conciliation Committee has already reached 
a consensus on the principle that gender quotas are legitimate 
instruments for achieving gender equality. We believe inclusion of 
professional posts as targets of gender quota provide a  legal basis 
for legally binding gender quotas for corporate boards.  
1 Ararat, M., Suel, E., Yurtoglu, B.B., 2014, Sustainable Development in Turkey: The 
Case in Context - An Update
Constitution of Turkey, Article 10:
Equality Before the Law 
Everyone is equal before the law without distinction as to language, 
UDFHFRORXUVH[SROLWLFDORSLQLRQSKLORVRSKLFDOEHOLHIUHOLJLRQDQG
sect, or any such grounds.
3DUDJUDSKDGGHGRQ0D\$FW1R0HQDQGZRPHQ
have equal rights. The State has the obligation to ensure that this 
HTXDOLW\ H[LVWV LQ SUDFWLFH 6HQWHQFH DGGHG RQ 6HSWHPEHU 
$FW1R0HDVXUHVWDNHQIRUWKLVSXUSRVHVKDOOQRWEH
interpreted as contrary to the principle of equality. 
3DUDJUDSKDGGHGRQ6HSWHPEHU$FW1R0HDVXUHV
to be taken for children, the elderly, disabled people, widows and 
orphans of martyrs as well as for the invalid and veterans shall not 
be considered as violation of the principle of equality.
1RSULYLOHJH VKDOO EH JUDQWHG WR DQ\ LQGLYLGXDO IDPLO\ JURXSRU
class. 
State organs and administrative authorities are obliged to act in 
compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their 
proceedings.
Draft Constitution, 
Related Paragraphs of Article 3 on Equality,
Constitutional Conciliation Committee
5. Men and women have equal rights. Measures taken for this 
purpose shall not be interpreted as contrary to the principle of 
equality. The State has the obligation to ensure that this equality 
H[LVWV LQSUDFWLFHDQG WRSUHYHQWYLROHQW DQGDEXVLYHEHKDYLRXU
directed at women.
6. The State takes precautions to remove obstacles for and all 
W\SHV RI GLVFULPLQDWLRQ DJDLQVW ZRPHQ·V H[HUFLVH RI ULJKWV DQG
freedoms in political, economic and cultural spheres. 
 ,W WDNHV VSHFLÀF DFWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ JHQGHU TXRWDV WR HQVXUH
women’s equal participation in Parliament, central organs and 
provincial organisations of political parties, administrative organs 
RIXQLYHUVLWLHVDQGWUDGHXQLRQVSURYLQFLDOFRXQFLOVSXEOLFRIÀFLDO
positions and posts taking up duty with all kind of elections such 
as in councils of metropolitan and provincial municipalities, as 
well as in all administrative and judicial bodies and professional 
positions.
1716 Women on Board - Turkey Women on Board - Turkey
PROJECT TEAM
Independent Women Directors Project
MELSA ARARAT, PhD
Project Director, IWD Project
6DEDQFÕ8QLYHUVLW\&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH
Forum
6(9'$$/.$1
3URMHFW0DQDJHU,:'3URMHFW
Sabanci University Corporate Governance 
Forum
0ø5+$1.g52ö/8*göhù
Projects Coordinator, 
Sabanci University Corporate Governance 
Forum
%(/*ø1$<7(.ø1
Project Consultant, IWD Project
6RODULV'DQÕúPDQOÕN
08=$))(5(52ö/83K'
Project Consultant, IWD Project 
.RFDHOL8QLYHUVLW\
ESRA SÜEL
Project Consultant, IWD Project
,PSHULDO&ROOHJH
085$7<(ùø/'(5(
IWD Project Partner Team
0DQDJLQJ3DUWQHU
(JRQ=HKQGHU,QWHUQDWLRQDO
$<ù(*hd/h2185
IWD Project Partner Team
0DQDJHPHQW&RQVXOWDQW
(JRQ=HKQGHU,QWHUQDWLRQDO
1918 Women on Board - Turkey Women on Board - Turkey
9$+$3081<$5&o-chair) 
Hürriyet
*h/'(17h5.7$1&o-chair)
.$*ø'(5
  
ADVISORY BOARD
Independent Women Directors Project
7$<)81%$<$=,7
%D\D]ÕW&RQVXOWLQJ6HUYLFHV
%27$1%(5.(5
0HULW5LVN0DQDJHPHQWDQG
Financial Consultancy
1$.ø<(%2<$&,*ø//(53K'
6DEDQFÕ8QLYHUVLW\
)h681$..$/%2=2.3hD
<DSÕ.UHGL%DQN
0(/7(0.8576$1
.XUWVDQ*URXS&RPSDQLHV
+$/(785*$<258d
&DSLWDO0DUNHWV%RDUGRI7XUNH\
 
6(/ø1g=
*DUDQWL%DQN
g=/(0'(1ø=0(1
Financial Literacy Association
$<ù(16$9&,
Artist and Former Swedish Trade 
Comissioner
ESø17$%2ö/8
7DERJOX	'HPLUKDQ$WWRUQH\VDW/DZ
6ø%(/$61$
$	%&RPPXQLFDWLRQ,QF
$<ù(<h.6(/3hD 
6DEDQFÕ8QLYHUVLW\*HQGHU)RUXP
NUR GER
786ø$'
(%58.g.6$/
Galatasaray Sports Club
1918 Women on Board - Turkey Women on Board - Turkey
APPENDIX A: GENDER DIVERSITY 
INDEX, WOMEN EMPOWERED BOARDS 
INDEX, AND RATIO OF FEMALE 
DIRECTORS IN BIST COMPANY BOARDS 
Company Gender Diversity Index Value
Women 
Empowered Index 
Value
Ratio of Female 
Directors on the 
Board
$'(/.$/(0&ø/ø. 0.35 0.30 0.23
$)<21dø0(172 0.27 0 0.16
$.%$1. 0.18 0.71 0.1
$.)(1+2/',1* 0.27 0.25 0.16
$.,17(.67ø/ 0.4 0.28 0.28
$.6$$.5ø/ø. 0.15 0 0.08
$.6$(1(5-ø 0.37 1.8 0.25
$.6ø*257$ 0.21 0.12 0.12
$/$5.2&$55ø(5 0.27 1.12 0.16
$/$5.2+2/'ø1* 0.19 0 0.11
$/&$7(//8&(177(/(7$ù7(/(.20ø1ø.$6<21 0.5 2.16 0.5
$/.ø0$/.$/ø.ø0<$ 0.19 0 0.11
$/.ø0.$ö,7 0.34 0.22 0.22
$1$'2/8&$06$1$<ø 0.27 0.46 0.16
$1$'2/8ø68=8 0.33 0.28 0.21
$1(/(/(.75ø.352-(7$$++h79(7ø&$5(7 0.4 0.28 0.28
$1(/7(/(.20ø1ø.$6<21(/(.7521ø.6ø67(0/(5ø 0.4 0.28 0.28
$5d(/ø. 0.15 0.08 0.08
$<(1(1(5-ø 0.24 0 0.14
$<*$= 0.19 0.62 0.11
%$*)$ù 0.24 0.11 0.14
%$19ø7%$1',50$9ø7$0ø1/ø<(06$1$<ø 0.24 0.16 0.14
%$7,dø0%$7,$1$'2/8dø0(1726$1$<ø 0.29 0.18 0.18
%$7,6g.(6g.(dø0(1726$1$<øø 0.29 0.18 0.18
%ø0(.6%ø/*øøù/(09(',ù7ø&$5(7 0.19 0.87 0.11
%2/8dø0(1726$1$<øø 0.24 0.14 0.14
%2586$1<$7,5,09(3$=$5/$0$ 0.24 0 0.14
%266$7ø&$5(79(6$1$<øøù/(70(/(5ø 0.24 0.28 0.14
%2<1(5%h<h.0$ö$=$&,/,. 0.4 1.11 0.28
%2<1(53(5$.(1'(9(7(.67ø/<$7,5,0/$5, 0.44 1.61 0.33
%5ø6$%5ø'*(6721(6$%$1&,/$67ø.6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.16 0.5 0.09
%85d(/ø.%856$d(/ø.'g.h06$1$<øø 0.48 2.42 0.6
%85d(/ø.9$1$6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.48 2.42 0.6
&$55()2856$&$55()2856$%$1&,7ø&$5(70(5.(=ø 0.15 0.22 0.08
d(/(%ø+$9$6(59ø6ø 0.21 0.16 0.12
dø06$dø0(1726$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.27 0 0.16
&5(',7:(67)$.725ø1* 0.48 2.23 0.4
'(0ø6$ù'g.h0(0$<(0$08//(5ø6$1$<ø 0.24 1.16 0.14
'(1ø=/ø&$06$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.44 1.7 0.33
'(5ø02'.21)(.6ø<21$<$..$%,'(5ø6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.48 0.97 0.42
'(9$+2/'ø1* 0.32 0.5 0.2
'ø7$ù'2ö$1<('(.3$5d$ø0$/$79(7(.1ø. 0.24 0.30 0.14
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'2ö$16,5.(7/(5*58%8+2/'ø1* 0.49 1.58 0.55
'2ö$1<$<,1+2/'ø1* 0.27 0.5 0.16
'2ö7$ù.(/(%(.02%ø/<$6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.27 0.25 0.16
'2ö8ù272027ø96(59ø69(7ø&$5(7 0.34 0.92 0.22
'<2%2<$)$%5ø.$/$5,6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.24 0 0.14
(&=$&,%$ù,<$3,*(5(d/(5ø6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.19 0.12 0.11
(&=$&,%$ù,<$7,5,0+2/'ø1*257$./,ö, 0.34 1.67 0.22
(*((1'h675ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.24 0.2 0.14
(*(*h%5(6$1$<ø 0.24 0 0.14
(,6(&=$&,%$ù,ø/$d6,1$ø9()ø1$16$/<$7,5,0/$56$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.27 0.39 0.16
(0(.(/(.75ø.(1'h675ø6ø 0.4 0.7 0.28
(5(ö/ø'(0ø5d(/ø.)$%5ø.$/$5, 0.19 0.11 0.11
(5680(<9(9(*,'$6$1$<ø 0.48 1.73 0.4
(6&2577(.12/2-,<$7,5,0 0.32 0 0.2
)ø1$16%$1. 0.15 0.08 0.08
*(56$1(/(.75ø.7ø&$5(79(6$1$<ø 0.4 0.28 0.28
*/2%$/<$7,5,0+2/'ø1* 0.24 0.1 0.14
*g/7$ù*g//(5%g/*(6ødø0(1726$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.4 0.48 0.28
*22'<($5/$67ø./(5ø 0.24 0.32 0.14
*6''(1ø=&ø/ø.*$<5ø0(1.8/ø1ù$$76$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.27 1.12 0.16
*6'+2/'ø1* 0.19 0.95 0.11
+$&,g0(56$%$1&,+2/'ø1* 0.44 1.19 0.33
+(.7$ù7ø&$5(7 0.24 0.14 0.14
+h55ø<(7*$=(7(&ø/ø.9(0$7%$$&,/,. 0.44 1.83 0.33
ø+/$6(9$/(7/(5øø0$/$76$1$<øø9(7ø&$5(7 0.24 0.45 0.14
ø1'(.6%ø/*ø6$<$56ø67(0/(5ø0h+(1'ø6/ø.6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.19 0.2 0.11
ø3(.'2ö$/(1(5-ø.$<1$./$5,$5$ù7,50$9(h5(7ø0 0.27 0 0.16
øú)ø1$16$/.ø5$/$0$ 0.16 0.09 0.09
,ù,./$5(1(5-ø9(<$3,+2/'ø1* 0.24 0.31 0.14
ø=2&$0 0.24 0.73 0.14
.$5$.$ù$7/$17ø6.,<0(7/ø0$'(1/(5.8<80&8/8.7(/(.20ø1ø.$6<216$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.44 0.5 0.33
.$56$12720$7ø96$1$<øø9(7ø&$5(7 0.24 0 0.14
.$57216$1.$57216$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.32 0.84 0.2
.(5(9ø7$ù*,'$6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.24 1.08 0.14
.2d+2/'ø1* 0.12 0.06 0.06
.21<$dø0(1726$1$<ø 0.15 0.08 0.08
.25'6$*/2%$/(1'h675ø<(/ø3/ø.9(.25'%(=ø6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.24 0.42 0.14
.2=$$/7,1øù/(70(/(5ø 0.44 0.33 0.33
.2=$$1$'2/80(7$/0$'(1&ø/ø.øù/(70(/(5ø 0.27 0 0.16
.h7$+<$3256(/(1 0.48 1.73 0.4
/ø1.%ø/*ø6$<$56ø67(0/(5ø<$=,/,0,9('21$1,0,6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.32 1.5 0.2
/2*2<$=,/,06$1$<øø9(7ø&$5(7 0.44 1.87 0.33
0$50$5ø6$/7,1<8186785ø67ø.7(6ø6/(5 0.27 1 0.16
0$56+$//%2<$9(9(51ø.6$1$<øø 0.32 1.2 0.2
0$57,27(/øù/(70(/(5ø 0.48 2.69 0.42
0(5.2*,'$6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.44 1.91 0.33
0(7527ø&$5ø9(0$/ø<$7,5,0/$5+2/'ø1* 0.27 0 0.16
021'ø7ø5(.876$1.$ö,79($0%$/$-6$1$<ø 0.27 1.16 0.16
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087/8<$7,5,0352-(9(*$<5ø0(1.8/*(/øù7ø50( 0.26 0.15 0.15
1(7+2/'ø1* 0.26 0.15 0.15
1(7785ø=07ø&$5(79(6$1$<ø 0.19 0.25 0.11
2/08.6$1,17(51$7,21$/3$3(5$0%$/$-6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.27 0.16 0.16
2093(752/2)ø6ø 0.32 0.9 0.2
g=%$/d(/,.%2586$1$<ø7ø&$5(79(7$$++h7 0.27 0 0.16
3$5.(/(.75ø.h5(7ø00$'(1&ø/ø.6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.19 0.25 0.11
3ø0$ù3/$67ø.ø1ù$$70$/=(0(/(5ø 0.32 0.2 0.2
3,1$5(17(*5((79(816$1$<øø 0.4 1.28 0.28
3,1$5686$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.4 1.28 0.28
3,1$56h70$08//(5ø6$1$<øø 0.4 1.28 0.28
3/$67ø..$57$.,//,.$57ø/(7øùø06ø67(0/(5ø6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.4 1.19 0.28
5(<6$ù7$ù,0$&,/,.9(/2-ø67ø.7ø&$5(7 0.24 0 0.14
6$1.23$=$5/$0$ø7+$/$7ø+5$&$7 0.24 0.14 0.14
6$5.8<6$1(/(.752/ø7ø.%$.,56$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.16 1.3 0.09
6$6$32/<(67(56$1$<ø 0.27 0 0.16
6(/d8.(&=$'(32687ø&$5(79(6$1$<ø 0.19 0.7 0.11
62'$6$1$<øø$ù 0.27 0.38 0.16
7$7*,'$6$1$<øø 0.32 1.02 0.2
7$9+$9$/ø0$1/$5,+2/'ø1* 0.15 0.45 0.08
7(.$57ø1ù$$77ø&$5(7785ø=06$1$<ø9(<$7,5,0/$5 0.44 0.33 0.33
7(.)(1+2/'ø1* 0.29 0.72 0.18
7(.126$ød9(',ù7ø&$5(7 0.27 0.36 0.16
7(.67ø/%$1. 0.44 1.41 0.33
7(6&2.ø3$.ø7/(3$=$5/$0$7ø&$5(7/2-ø67ø.9(*,'$6$1$<ø 0.19 0.33 0.11
75$.<$&$06$1$<øø 0.27 0.36 0.16
78.$ù*,'$6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.24 0.14 0.14
7h026$1027259(75$.7g56$1$<ø 0.32 1.5 0.2
7h35$ù7h5.ø<(3(752/5$)ø1(5ø/(5ø 0.12 0.06 0.06
TURCAS PETROL 0.48 2.77 0.42
7h5.(.2120ø%$1.$6, 0.13 0.13 0.07
7h5.+$9$<2//$5, 0.19 0.54 0.11
7h5.35<60ø$1.$%/29(6ø67(0/(5ø 0.21 0.74 0.12
7h5.78%25*%ø5$9(0$/76$1$<øø 0.48 2.95 0.42
7h5.ø<(*$5$17ø%$1.$6, 0.18 0.44 0.1
7h5.ø<(øù%$1.$6, 0.29 1.15 0.18
7h5.ø<(6,1$ø.$/.,10$%$1.$6, 0.18 0.1 0.1
7h5.ø<(ùøù(9(&$0)$%5ø.$/$5, 0.34 0.72 0.22
9(67(/%(<$=(ù<$6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.27 0.28 0.16
9(67(/(/(.7521ø.6$1$<ø9(7ø&$5(7 0.27 0.2 0.16
9ø.ø1*.$ö,79(6(/h/2= 0.24 1 0.14
<$3,9(.5('ø%$1.$6, 0.37 1.27 0.25
<$7$6<$7$.9(<25*$16$1$<,, 0.4 0.61 0.28
=25/8(1(5-ø 0.24 0 0.14
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